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TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY-A POSSIBLE FRAUD
ON CREDITORS IN VIRGINIA
X conveyed land to H and W, husband and wife, by deed with
a general warranty and containing in addition the clause, "as ten-
ants by the entireties, with right of survivorship as at common law."
Three years later, H and W conveyed the land to W without con-
sideration. Three months afterwards, C obtained a judgment against
H for $2800. Later, charging that the conveyance to W was made
to defraud him, C filed a bill in equity to enforce the lien of his
judgment. H and W demurred to the bill. Their demurrer was
sustained and the bill dismissed, and this decree was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Appeals. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735,
66 S.E. 2nd 599 (1951).
By this decision it would seem that the highest court of Vir-
ginia has committed itself to the proposition that a debtor, relying
on the court's strict common law interpretation of tenancy by the
entirety can escape his obligations, unless it is the joint debt of both
spouses, in which case there is liability.1 The court's reasoning
regarding tenancies by the entirety is in accord with decided cases.
Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N. E. 613 (1929), upon
which the court relied, is directly in point, and represents the weight
of authority given by the cases cited therein. 2
"The nature of a tenancy by the entirety ... is founded on the
common-law doctrine of the unity of husband and wife as constitut-
ing in law but one. person. A conveyance to a husband and wife as
tenants by the entirety creates one indivisible estate in them both
and in the survivor, which neither can destroy by any separate act.
Both husband and wife are seized of such an estate per tout et non
per my as one person, and not as joint tenants or tenants in com-
mon.... There can be no severance of such estate by the act of
either alone without the assent of the other, and no partition during
their joint lives, and the survivor becomes seized as sole owner of
the whole estate regardless of anything the other may have done." 3
1. 35 A.L.R. 144.
2. Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 109 A. 418 (1920); Chandler v.
Cheney, 37 Ind. 391 (1871); Cochran v. Kerney, 9 Bush. (Ky.) 199
(1872); Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, 103 A. 94, (1918); Turner v.
Davidson, 277 Mich. 459, 198 N.W. 886 (1924); Stifel's Union Brew-
ing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918); Beihl v. Martin,
236 Pa. 519, 84 A. 953 (1912).
3. Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N.E. 685 (1927).
By statute in Virginia, a husband and wife are permitted to join in
a deed conveying land to either of them alone.4
The result of this decision, reached by application of the ex-
ception5 to the section of the Virginia Code abolishing tenancies by
the entirety,6 is more open to criticism than is the reasoning. These
statutes were originally enacted in 1849 as a property reform7
and not as an aid to creditors.
There is authority for limiting these estates, in behalf of credi-
tors, by refusing to allow a debtor to hide behind the skirts of a
tenancy by the entirety. The Pennsylvania court, for example, has
said that a judgment against the husband is a lien on his contingent
expectant interest, even though only enforceable when the husband
becomes sole owner by virtue of the wife's death.8 The Florida
court has been more outspoken in deciding that estates in entirety
cannot be created at the expense of creditors and held in fraud of the
latter's right.9 In this view the Supreme Court of Michigan has
concurred. 10
In Virginia this bar to creditors may very likely arise in per-
sonalty as well as in realty, for the Code reads... "any estate, real
or personal."'11 This provision, although in accord with the law in
other jurisdictions allowing estates by the entirety in personal
property as well as in lands, 12 opens the door for more debt-free
estates.
It is noted that dangers of tenancies by the entirety are not
limited to creditors. The Supreme Court of New York has held in
a recent case that a husband, co-tenant by entirety, could not evict
his mother-in-law from the property. 13
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-9 (1950).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 .(1950). ("The preceding section shall not
apply to any estate which joint tenants have as executors or trustees, nor
to an estate conveyed or devised to persons in their own right when it
manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was intended
the part of the one dying should then belong to the others . . .").
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (1950). ("... And if hereafter any estate,
real or personal, be conveyed or devised to a husband and his wife, they
shall take and hold the same by moieties in like manner as if a distinct
moiety had been given to each by a separate conveyance.").
7. 2 MINOR, REAL PRoPmTY § 855 (1928).
8. Klopfenstein v. Chadbourne, 105 Pa. Super. 530, 161 A. 642 (1932).
9. Whetstone v. Coslick, 117 Fla. 203, 157 So. 666 (1934).
10. Long v. Earle, 277 Mich. 505, 269 N.W. 577, (1936).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (1950).
12. 41 CJ.S. Personal Property § 35, 477; George v. Dutton's Estate, 94 Vt.
76, 108 A. 515 (1920).
13. Fine v. Scheinhaus, 109 N.Y.Supp.2d 307 (1952).
The importance of the principal case is emphasized by distin-
guishing the three Virginia cases it refused to overrule. These, 14
although involving the indestructibility of tenancies by the entirety,
concerned disallowance of partition suits between the parties in
interest, not creditors or third parties.
Possible use of estates by entirety to make oneself creditor-
proof was suggested by Emerson G. Spies 15 in 1948. Surely the
opportunity is unique, and perhaps its use should not remain un-
limited. It would seem from the creditor's standpoint that tenancies
by the entirety should either be abolished without exception, or
restricted. Since the Supreme Court of Appeals has taken a firm
defensive stand, it is now a matter of legislation. As tenancies by
the entirety have distinct ,advantages, restriction rather than aboli-
tion would be indicated. This might best be done by following the
spirit of the legislation on spendthrift trusts and gifts. Spendthrift
trusts are limited to a principal sum of $100,000 free from creditors
of the beneficiary, and the grantor is prohibited from establishing
any trust in prejudice of his existing creditors ;16 all gifts are void
as to existing creditors of the donor.17 Comparable restrictions
upon tenancies by the entirety would bring them within our legis-
lati've policy.
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14. Burroughs v. Gorman, 166 Va. 58, 184 S.M. 174 (1936); Allen v.
Parkey, 166 Va. 58, 184 S.E. 174 (1930); Drake v. Blythe, 108 Va. 38,
60 SE. 632 (1908).
15. Emerson G. Spies, Some Comideras om m Cowr g so Husband and
Wife, 34 Va. L. Rev. 480, 492 (1948).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (1950).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (1950).
